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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utal1
TOM:\IIE .\IAURINE BROWN,

Plaintiff and

Respondent~

vs.

Civil
No. 7959

HAROLD COOK and
CORA COOK,
Defendent and Appellar.t.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
NATURE OF CASE
This action was brought by plaintiff (respondent) upon
her complaint and a Writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the
custody of a minor child. Upon failure to present the child in
court, the defendent Harold Cook was found guilty of contempt.
A judgment awarding the custody of the child to the plaintiff
as against the defendants and a judgement of contempt against
the defendant (appellant) Harold Cook was entered. From
this judgment the defendant Harold Cook appeals.
STATEMENT OF CASE

The respondent the natural mother of a minor child, Rono
aid Glen Cook, age 3, brought this action by way of Writ of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Habeas Corpus served upon the paternal grandparents, Harold Cook and Cora Cook, who at that time were keeping and
caring for the minor child during the absence of the child's
father, Glen H. Cook, who was serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States. The Writ was issued upon the complaint
and request of the respondent, the plaintiff in the initial action.
The record shows that the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
served by the Deputy Sheriff of Uintah County on the 1st day
of December, 1952, wherein the appellant and defendant~
(hereinafter to be known as the defendants) were ordered to
bring the person of Ronald Glen Cook, the minor child, beforE"the court on the 9th day of December, 1952, to be dealt with
according to law. The complaint prayed for an award of custody to the mother. The record indicates that, following the
service of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the grandparents, the
defendants, contacted the father of the child, Glen H. Cook,
and informed him of the nature of the action and that they
were ordered by Writ of Habaes Corpus to bring the child to
court and that the question of the child's custody would there
be dealt with. Some time in the evening of the 8th day of
December, 1952, the natural father of the child, Glen H. Cook.
returned to the home of one of his sisters, where the defend·
ants were with the child, took the child and left and did not
return. The defendants were thus unable to be present in
court with the child as ordered. This inability resulted in ..
judgment of contempt against the defendant Harold Cook.
The defendant, Harold Cook, the grandfather, was the
only one to take the stand, and he testified that the father of
the child came and took the child while he and his wife were
at the home of their daughter, that the child was taken by his
natural father to his own home. When the defendants returned,
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they found the infant's clothing gone, but the car belonging to
the father of the child was left at the home of the defendants.
The father of the child was never made a party to this action, nor was any attempt made to serve him either by personal
sen·ice or by publication. The record shows that the plaintiff
obtained a divorce from the child's father some time in June of
1952 and that she remarried immediately thereafter. These
divorce proceedings were first instituted in January of 1952.
After the plaintiff filed action for divorce, she admitted that
she had never attempted to get the custody of the child from
the farther ( R. 29).
Only the plaintiff and the defendant Harold Cook testified. The record shows that the court, upon hearing the evidence adduced, found the defendant Harold Cook guilty of
contempt and ordered him to pay a fine of $150.00 . and
sentenced him to be confined in the county jail for a period
of 30 days. No affidavit was filed formally charging the deendant with contempt of court.
The execution of the sentence imposed for contempt w~s
suspended for a period of 10 days, in which the court directed
the defendant to obtain the child from the natural father and
tum him over to the natural mother either in Utah or in North
Dakota and take a receipt for said child. If this was complied
with, the jail sentence together with $100.00 of the fine would
be suspended, and the defendant would be required to pay
only the sum of $50.00. The Findings of Fact filed and signed
found the plaintiff was the mother of the infant, age 3, aad that
the defendants were his paternal grandparents; that the natural
father had left the child with his parents (defendants) during
his absence in the Armed Forces of the United States; that
plaintiff had obtained a divorce from the natural father of the
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child and remarried within a few days thereafter but that such
action did not disqualify her to her rights of custody to the
minor child; that the plaintiff as the natural mother was awarded
the custody as against the defendants. A decree was accordinly
entered awarding plaintiff custody as against the defendants
grandparents of the minor child. No determination was made
as between the rights of the natural mother (the plaintiff) and
the father (who was not made a party to the action) to the
custody of the child.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The defendant Harold Cook assigns the following errors
upon which he relies for reversal of the decree and judgment
appealed from and for an order of this court directing the trial
court to make and enter judgment of dismissal of this matter.
1. The trial court erred in awarding the custody of the
child to his natural mother, the plaintiff, since the child was out
of the court's jurisdiction and was never before the court for the
court to determine such custody as between the mother and
any persons.
2. The court erred in holding the defendant Harold Cook
in contempt without the filing of an affidavit as required by tbP.
provisions 78-32-3 ( 104-45-3).
3. The court erred in finding the defendant guilty of contempt since there is no evidence in the record to sustain or suppo~ such a finding.
4. The court erred in holding the defendant guilty of contempt on the basis that the defendant did not notify the Sheriff
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of the father's retun1 or his counsel or counsel for the plaintif
(R. ·H).
5. The court erred in holding that the defendant permitted
the natural father of the child to take the infant in question
( R. 42) and that such was a violation of the order of the court.

The e\·idence in the record fails to show that the defendants
were eYer in a position to refuse the natural father of thP.
child his right to the control and custody of the infant.
6.

The court erred in holding that the defendant could

purge himself of the jail sentence and $100.00 of the $150.00
fine imposed by obtaining the custody of the child and transferring the same to the natural mother either in Vernal or in
North Dakota. By so doing the court in effect determined
that the plaintiff was entitled to custody of the child as
against the natural father of the child, who is not made a party
to the action, and was an attempt to coerce the natural father
into the delivery of the custody of the child without due pro
cess of law and the opportunity to be heard.
7.. The court erred in holding the defendant Harold Cook
in contempt and imposing judgment and fine on him on tht>
ground that he was not given the opportunity to answer and
present evidence as required by 78-32-9, ( 104-45-9).
8. The court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the defendant
for contempt on the ground that no findings of fact or conclusions of law were made or entered by the court and the same
were not waived by the defendant.
9. The court erred in imposing punishment without notice
of the charge of contempt as required by law.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THAT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO ITS NATURAL
MOTHER, SINCE THE CHILD WAS OUT OF THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
The record shows that the infant, Ronald Glen Cook
was never before the court, and there is no showing in the
record that the court acquired jurisdiction of his person. The
court held ( R. 42) that the natural father had taken the child
out of the court's jurisdiction. The attention of the court is
particularly called to the wording of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
served upon the defendants wherein they were commanded
" . . . to appear before the Judge of the above entitled court
on the 9th day of December, 1952, at the courtroom in the
County Courthouse at Vernal, Utah, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock
A.M., and to bring with you the person of Ronald Glen Cook,
then and there to be dealt with according to law." The wording indicates that the jurisdiction of the infant was to be obtained upon his being presented in court. The authorities art>
in accordance that the jurisdiction of the courts of the state
to regulate the custody of the infant does not depend upon
the domicile of the parent but upon the residence of the child.
This ruling is followed in cases where divorces are granted in
states other than where the children reside. As an example of
this, the record shows that the plaintiff obtained a divorce in
the state of Wyoming but that custody was not awarded because the child was not there. The record shows that the child
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was not in the court's jurisdiction and was probably out of the
state of Utah at the time the court heard the matter (R. 43).
No proceeding had been instituted against the father of the
child, who had his custody, to place the child before the court
to be dealt with according to law. (See Sheehy vs. Sheehy, 88
N.H. 223, 107 ALR 635; also Finlay vs. Finlay-New York
Case-148 NE 624, 40 ALR 937).
POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANT HAROLD COOK IN CONTEMPT
WITHOUT THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT AS
REQUIRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF 78-32-3
( 104-45-3).
The provisions of the applicable statute, 78-32-3, ( 10445-3), require the issuance of an affidavit to be presented to
the court when the alleged contempt is not committed in its
prsence. The law recognizes two distinct types of contemptdirect and constructive. The direct contempts are those matters of contemptuous condut or those which tend to impugn
the dignity of the court which are committed in its presence or
in the presence of the judge while at chambers. A direct contempt consists of words spoken or acts committed in the presence of the court or during its intermissions which tend to subvert, embarrass or prevent justice. These are acts which the
court can see and take cognizance of itself and which it need
not be advised of by third parties. Indirect or constructive contempts are those actions committed not in the presence of the
court but at a distance from it which tend to degrade the court
or obstruct, interrupt or prevent or embarrass the administration of justice. 12 Am. Jur. 390-392.
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The statute above referred to reads as follows:
"\Vhen a contempt is committed in the immediate
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers. it
may be punished summarily, for which an order must be
made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded
against h thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be
punished as prescribed in section 78-32-10 hereof. When
the contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presBnce of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the
facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the
facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers." (Italics mine)
This matter was thoroughly discussed in the case of Robinson vs. City Court for Ogden, Weber County, et al, 112 U. 36,
185 P. (2d) 256, wherein the petitioner made a remark on or
about the time he entered an elevator in the presence of the
judge relative to the court being a ''kangaroo court." The
judge immediately took Robinson to the court and there imposed a judgment upon him for contempt, which was brought
before this court on a Writ of Prohibition. It was held that
the objectionable remark was not in the presence of the court
or the judge at chambers. The court there held:
"It is necessary, in all proceedings for contempt
which are not committed in the presence of the court,
in oroer to give the court jurisdiction, that an affida_vit
or affidavits be presented to the court stating the facts
constituting contempt. Young v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560;
Crowther et al., vs. District Court of Salt Lake County,
93 Utah 586, 45 P .(2d) 243; Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 568
37 P. ( 2d) 777. A contempt proceeding is separate and
apart from the principle action and in order for the court
to acquire jurisdiction of the offense when committed. as
here, it is necessary that an affidavit or initiating pleading filed. Unless this is done, subsequent pt'Oceedings
are palpably null and void... (Italics mine)
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This case also holds the affidavit takes the place of the
complaint, and, whether the contempt be regarded as civil or
criminal when not committed in the presence of the court or
the judge in his chambers, the court is without jurisdiction to
proceed until a pleading of some nature has been served on
the accused and filed with the court. One of the purposes for
an affidavit is to advise the defendant of the particular facts
of which he is accused so that he may properly defend against
the charge or offer such extenuating and justifiable circumstances as the facts may warrant. supra. Such right is a right
of due process guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of
Utah, Section 12, Article I.
The above cited case emphasized very well the necessity
for an affidavit in cases of this type where the contempt is not
committed in the presence of the court prior to the court's obtaining jurisdiction thereof. The following from the opinion is
quoted:
.. Not having been informed against, there would be
no pleading in the district court and no way for the petitioner to legally know the nature and cause of the accusation against him. One might as well say that the
court could, from the benc,h, inform a person he was
guilty of burglary and sentence him to jail. In both
instances the accused has been told the nature of the
offense but not in the manner or the way required by
the constitution and statutes of this state. Section 12,
Article I, of the Constitution of the State of Utah gives
to an accused in a criminal action the right to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against )lim
and to have a copy thereof. Section 104-45-3 (78-32-3 ),
U.C.A., grants this same right to an accused in contempt
proceedings when committed as in this proceeding."
Thus, the lack of an affidavit as contemplated by statute purged
the trial court of any jurisdiction in its judgment of contempt
and constitutes a reversible error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
POINT 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT SINCE THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUSTAIN
OH SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING.
It is a general rule that the evidence required prior to
a conviction or a judgment in cases of criminal contempt must
be beyond all reasonable doubt; that is, the degree of proof
upon which the judgment or conviction is founded must be
beyond all reasonable doubt. In other cases the courts make a
requirement that the evidence upon which a conviction for
contempt is sustained ~hall be by clear and convincing proof,
which is regarded by most courts as more than a mere preponderence of the evidence. In many jurisdictions in which the
violation of a civil injunction is considered crminal in its nature,
mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffcent to support a
convction. 12 Am. Jr. 44-2. 29 ALR 127. 49 ALR 978.
This court has held that, though sufficient facts might appear in the evidence upon which the court might sustain a
conviction of contempt, this is nevertheless not sufficient. The
court is required to investigate the charge against the accused:
and the accused cannot be held guilty without a hearing, evidence and proof, Herald Republican Pub. Co. vs. Lewis, 42
U. 188, 129 U624. In the case above cited, it was held that.
before a conviction could be had, the guilt of the accused must
be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. A mere preponderance of the evidence not being enough.
The record fails to show anywhere a contumacious or wilful attitude on the part of the defendant Harold Cook to violate the order of the court. The defendant informed the father

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
of the child that he as under order to present the boy in court
on the prescribed date prior to the father's taking the child with
him. The record fails to show any cooperation on the part of
the defendant with any person in the removal of the child.
The record indicates that the father of the child did not
specifically state when he was going nor where he was going
with the child but stated mere]y, "I ain't going to stay here.
I'm going to take him and go." ( R. 31). On cross examination,
the record shows the defendant told the father of the child
that he was under order to have the child in court on the
designated date. ( R 33). The record shows that, after service
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the defendant contacted his
son in California and advised him of the nature of the proceeding ( R. 32 ) . The record shows that the father advised the
defendant that he had had legal advice in the army ( R. 35);
and that, after being so advised, the defendant let the father
take the boy. From the above there is no indication that the
defendant committed a contempt in his violation of the order.
Further, it is required as a matter of law, before a person
can be found guilty of contempt, that he must have the ability
to perform the act required. Thus, it is held in the case of
Limb vs. Limb, 113 U. 385, 195 P. (2d) 263, that a person who
puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with the court
order and is still unable to do so is not guilty of contempt on
account of such failure. In the case of Foreman vs. Foreman,
111 U. 72, 176 P. (2d) 144. this court held that, before a
court is justified in awarding damages in a contempt proceeding, the court must consider the ability of the party
charged with contempt to perform. In Hillyard vs. District
Court of Cache County, 68 U. 220, 249 P 806, this court held:
"Under the authorities cited and the uniform holdings of the courts, it is a prerequisite in contempt pro-
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ceedings of the nature here under review to an order
committing to jail that the one charged should be
found able to comply with the court's order or that he
had intentionally deprived himself of the ability to comply with such order. The court did not make such- a
finding. The language of section 6829, supra, seems to be
mandatory that findings are necessary to support a
judgment in actions in which the court is required to
make findings unless such findings are waived."
Thus, in the instant case, there must be ~vidence to show that
the defendant, by his acts, deprived himself of the ability to
perform the order of the court. This is not borne out by the
evidence before the court.
POINT 4.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT ON THE BASIS
THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO NOTIFY
THE SHERIFF, HIS COUNSEL OR COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFF OF THE FATHER'S RETURN.
The defendant was charged with contempt, as far
as can be determined from the record for permitting the
child's father to take the child and on the basis that he failed
to inform his counsel, the Sheriff, or counsel for the plaintiff
of the father's returning and taking the child with him. It is
axiomatic that one cannot be placed under obligation by indirect means to the court. Had the court through some process
made the defendant the child's keeper and charged him with
the well-being and safety of the child in question subsequent to
the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and prior to
the hearing by some proper proceeding, there may then have
been some ground for the contention that the defendant violated a trust in not notifying the Sheriff or the court or some
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other individuals of the father's taking the child. However.
nothing contained in the Writ places upon the defendants any
compuJsion or obligation relative to the court other than that
directly recited therein. The defendants were not the sheriff~
nor were they officers of the court. They were merely individuals who were striving to the best of their ability to care for
and protect their grandchild for a temporary and indefinite
period of time, and the discharge of any such voluntary ohligation did not or could not carry with it any obligations to
the court upon which the court could hold the defendant in
contempt. Such failure on the part of the defendant to imme-·
diately inform his counsel or other authorities as indicated by
the trial court may have been imprudent, but it was certainly
not contemptuous when one considers that the objectionable
act or acts occured in the wintertime, in the afternoon or evening and in a rural area, to-wit, Davis Ward (rural area 6If:1
miles southeast from Vemal). The record shows that early the
next morning counsel for the defendant was notified and that
immediately after notification counsel for the plaintiff was
contacted and so informed of the removal of the child.
It is noted that there is contention made by the plaintiff
that the defendant, by notifying the father by telephone or
other co:rm:nunication, was in violation of the spirit of the
Habeas Corpus. The record fails to show that the plaintiff at
any time sought to make the natural father a party to any
action 1concerning the custody of the infant. The record
fails to show any effort on the part of the plaintiff or her
counsel or any attempt by them to communicate with the
natural father of the child. No service was ever sought upon the
natural father by the plaintiff, and the record seems to indicate
that this action was merely an abortive attempt on the part of
the plaintiff to acquire the custody of the child in the ah-
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sence of his natural father without affording him any oppor·
tunity to be heard or to testify relative to any right that he
might have which may have been paramount to the right of the
plaintiff to said custody.

POINT 5.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT PERMITTED THE NATURAL
FATHER OF THE CHILD TO TAKE THE INFANT
IN QUESTION AND THAT SUCH WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT.
As a matter of law, it is held, where there is no adjudication to the rights of children, it is prima facie that thP
parents have equal rights to the custody and control of their
children. The common law rule is that the father has a paramount right to the custody of his children; however, this has
been modified by statutes and recent holdings and particularly
by our courts, which give the parents equal right to the custody and control of the children where there is no adjudication
otherwise. In the case of Sherry vs. Doyle, 68 U. 74, 249 P
250. 48 ALR 131, this court has sustained the paramount right
of the father to the care, custody and control of his children. The
facts of that case are similar to those invovled here in that
the child had been left by its parent with the defendants Doyle
while he worked at various places, the child being about 4
years of age at the time of the action. Upon refusal to deliVf~r
the custody of the child, which had been turned over to the
Doyles under contract for care and keeping thereof, the father
obtained a Writ of Habeas Corpus; and the court sustained his
right to the custody of the child as against the Doyles. The
father at that time had no home, but the court held that any
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right the defendants might have must yield to that of the
father. Thus, by analogy, we find that the father in this particular case had a paramount right to the care, custody and
control of his child and that the defandants were in no legal
position to forbid him that right or refuse to permit the child
to accompany its natural father wherever he chose to take it.
It should be borne in mind that the litigation here in the
instant case does not concern the right of custody between the
natural parents of the child, but merely whether or not, by virtue of the i;)suance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the defendant
(not one of the natural parents) could deny the natural parent
the right to the custody and control of the child, particularly
where such custody and control had been, during the latter
months of the marriage of the plaintiff and the child's father
and subsequent to the divorce, continuously with the natural
father of the child.

POINT 6.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT COULD PURGE HIMSELF OF THE
JAIL SENTENCE AND $100 OF THE $150 FINE
IMPOSED BY OBTAINING THE INFANT CHILD
AND DELIVERING ITS CUSTODY TO THE
CHILD'S NATURAL MOTHER.
The courts uniformly hold as a matter of law that parents
shall be entitled to the care, custody and control of their children and that they may not be deprived of the same without
due process of law, which presupposes that notice and hearing will be had prior to the depriving the parents, or either
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of them, of the custody of their children. The holding in the
present case ( R. 43) that
"the court therefore is going to suspend, and its is ordered
that the execution upon this judgment of contempt be
suspended, for a period of ten days, all of it, and at the
end of that time it will be further suspended upon the
condition that the defendant or the natural father deliver:; the custody of this child to the natural mother in
accordance with her odrer, whether that is at her home
in Taigo, North Dakota, or here, as it may be most
desirable for her, and taking a receipt from the natural
mother for the child and filing that receipt with the
clerk of this court. If that is done, all except the $50.00
of the judgment-the jail sentence and the bal~ce of
the fine, all but the $50.00 fine-will be suspended."
indicates that the court by such judgment attempted to award
the custody of the minor child to his natural mother without
giving the natural father of the child an opportunity to be
heard. This was sought to be done by coercion in that the
natural father would surrender his child rather than see his
father go to jail and pay the fine imposed. This is home out by
the record ( R. 43) where the court states:
"and I have no reason to believe that the natural father
won't consider this situation that, the court feels, he has
helped to impose upon his father as being rather serious
and that he will not be pleased at all with this judgment."
Also: "... the Court feels that there will be some cooperation-and I hope that there will be-by the natural father,
who is not before this Court, and has not been served
with any process, and that he will be glad as soon as he
knows what the lay of this case is, to cooperate with the
Court, and with these good people, to get the child to its
proper custodian in accordance with the judgment and
finding of the Court."
The above, in the face of no attempt on the part of tlw
plaintiff to contact the natural father of the child or to make
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him a party to the action. constitutes reversible error insofar
as it is an attempt to obtain an objective by circuity without
affording the pa1ty directly connected therewith a full opportunity to be heard.
The natural father of the child was not before the court,
nor was he served with any process, nor at any time has the
court denied him, by implication or otherwise, the custody or the
right of custody to his child. His taking of the child could
under no stretch of imagination constitute a violation of any
order of the court since he, as the natural father, being not
deprived of its custody, would be entitled thereto. (See Sherry
r.:s. Doyle~ supra. )
The record indicates that in December of 1951 the plaintiff left the infant child with his father and went to Wyoming
and that plaintiff had not had the child with her since July,
1951, except for a short period of time in November and
December, 1951, ( R. 4, 14, 16); that thereafter she, according to her testimony sought to have the custody of the child.
The extent of her efforts was to write to her husband. In
January of 1952, she filed an action for divorce in the state
of Wyoming. The divorce was granted in June of the same
year. The plaintiff testified that at no time after the filirig of
the divorce did she attempt to obtain the custody of her child
( R. 28-29). Immediately after her divorce, she was remarried and admitted that no attempt was made by her to obtain the custody of the child until immediately prior to the
filing of this action ( R. 23-24). The actions of the plaintiff,
the natural mother of the child in this respect, by abandoning
the infant with his natural father, without inquiries relative to
his whereabout or an attempt to obtain his custody for a period
from about August 1951, till November of 1952 casts grave
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question upon any presupposed paramount right that she, as
the natural mother of the child, might have to his custody or
control over that of his natural father.
Thus, we see that the error above noted was an attempt
by the court to give the custody of the infant child to his natural mother, to whom any paramount right of custody can
well be considered to have been forfeited, and this through coercion upon the only parties before the court upon whom the
court might use force to bring about such ends.

POINT 7.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANT HAROLD COOK IN CONTEMPT AND
IMPOSING JUDGMENT AND FINE ON HIM ON
THE GROUND THAT HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER AND PRESENT EVIDEN(;E AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
The provisions of 78-32-9 ( 104-45-9) provides as follows:
..When the person arrested has been brought up or
has appeared the court or judge must proceed to investigate the charge, and must hear any answer which the
person arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses for or against him; for which an adjuo!'nment may be had from time to time, if necessary."
In the case of Foreman vs. Foreman (citing other cases),
supra, in discussing the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, this court held if the contempt proceeding was
merely one of fine and/ or imprisonment, then it is criminal
in nature; thus, the instant case is one of criminal contempt
falling within the scope of the above statute.
In the case at issue, the defendant had no notice of any
charge of contempt; no affidavit was filed formally charging
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him with contempt as required; and no hearing was held. The
defendant was found guilty by the court without having any
opportunity to present evidence or to subpoena witnesses in
bis behalf or to deny the charges placed against him. This
case is analogous to the case of Robinson vs. City Court for the
City of Ogden, supra, wherein it was held that Section 12 of
Articie I of the Constitution provided that in cases of this kind
the accused has a right to demand the nature of the cause
of the accusation against him and have a copy thereof. It was
also held that the same right is given to one accused of
criminal contempt when the alleged contempt is not committed in the presence of the court or judge in chambers.
It further held that the accused is entitled to be informed
of the charge against him, to be permitted to plead to the
charge, to be represented by counsel of his own choosing and
to be afforded the right and opportunity to be heard.
In the case of Herald-Republican Pub. Co. vs. Lewis,
supra, this court held that the above statute does not contemplate the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings as
in civil cases. The court «must hear any answer« in proceeding to investigate, and nothing short of a plea of ·guilty
or its equivalent will justify a judgment of conviction without
evidence, and without an investigation of the charge. If further
holds that a recital in a judgment of conviction for contempt
not committed in the court's presence that «the matter is submitted upon its merits upon affidavit and the answers,'~ etc.
does not show a waiver of a trial or a hearing, or a consent· to
render final judgment in the cause on the pleadings and
without trial. It is also noted that a recital in the judgement
of conviction that the accused had not legal reason to give
why judgment should not be pronounced against him cannot
support the contention of a trial or a hearing or an investiga-
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tion or an opportunity to be heard. "The right which an accused has to be heard on the merits is before and not after
afte1· he is condemned." (Italics mine) Herald-Republican Pub.
Co. vs. Lewis, supra.
In the instant case the court found the defendant Harold
Cook guilty of contempt without granting him any opportunity
to be heard relative to the contempt charged. He was never
informed of the charge against him, and at no time was he
given an opportunity to speak until the court stated:
"The court, having found the defendant Harold Cook
guilty of contempt, asks counsel if defendant is prepared
to receive the judgment of the court." (Italics mine)
Thus, we find that the court in its judgment did not afford the
defendant opportunitv to be heard as required by the above
quoted section and as such constitutes reversible error.

POINT 8.
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT FOR CONTEMPT ON
THE GROUND THAT NO FINDING OF FACT OR
CONCLUSIONS OR LAW WERE MADE OR ENTERED BY THE COURT AND THE SAME WERE
NOT WAIVED BY DEFENDANT.
In the instant case the only findings of fact entered
relative to the contempt of the defendant are found in the
record. None are separately made or filed herein. The record
is very meager in its recital of the statements it holds to be contempt (R. 41-42). The only reference made by the court
is that the defendant permitted the father to take the child out
of the jurisdiction of the court. In the Utah case of Ex parte
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Gerber, 8-! U. 4-H, 29 P ( 2cl) 932, which was decided by this
Court, the Court held that it was necessary that the Court
m~~ke findings prior to any judgment of contempt, and a failure
to do so rendered the judgment of the Court null and void. In
the Gerber case the petitioner. Gerber. who had previously
been committed for a contempt of court for failure to pay
certain payments to his divorced wife, applied for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus; and. in reviewing the facts, the Court held as
follows:
" . . . no findings of fact were made or otherwise stated
that the defendant had property, means, or present or
any ability to comply with the decree or any part of the
judgment or any order of the court with respect to
the payment of any of the default payments, or that the
defendant had willfully refused to pay any of such back
installments, or that he had intentionally or otherwise
deprived himself of ability to comply therewith nor is it
recited or otherwise indicated that the order of contempt or commitment was based on any evidence adduced before the court or on which the order of contempt and commitment was based. Because of the failure of the court to make findings in one or more of
such particulars or the equivalent thereof, unless waived, of which there is no evidence, the order or ju~g
ment of the court adjudging the defendant guilty of
contempt for failure to pay the installments as decreed
and ordering him committed, as was done, has no support, and thus was rendered without jurisdiction, ancl
is null and void . . .
..Such holding is to the effect, and is supported by ample
authority, there cited, that, unless the court on a hearing before it invoking jurisdiction has made and filed
findings of fact to the effect that the defendant had
ability or was able to comply with the decree or ord~rs
of the court, or intentionally and contumaciously had
deprived himself of ability to comply therewith, the
court was without jurisdiction to commit the defendant
as for contempt."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
This court, in the case of State vs. Bartholomew, 85 U.
94, 38 P. ( 2d) 753, held that findings of fact are necessary to
support a judgment of contempt. In this case the defendant
Bartholomew was cited in on an order to show cause supported
by an affidavit that he had not complied with the order of
the court requiring him to pay certain sums of money growing
out of bastardy proceedings. The Court declared:
"Since the ability of the defendant to comply with
the order of the court is essential to constitute a contempt, it being conceded that the order has not been
obeyed, a consideration of certain facts to determine
whether a contempt has been committed is necessarily required. The fact, covering the essential facts involved,
must be made by the court in order to support a judgment of contempt. 104-26-3, R. S. 1933, provides that:
'In giving the decision the facts found and the conclusions of law must be separately stated, and the
judgment mu~t thereupon be entered accordingly.'
''This section, together with 104-26-2, has been before
this court in numerous cases, and we have consistently
held that 'it is the duty of the court to find upon all
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failurt
to do so is reversible error. Piper vs. Eakle, 18 Utah,
342, 2 P 2d) 909,910. It has also been held that findings which are only mere conclusions such as that all
the allegations of a complaint are true, or that defendant has failed to establish a defense, or that the court
finds for plaintiff and against defendant, are wh~lly
insufficient to meet the requirements of the above
statutes and cannot support a judgment. Piper vs. Eakle,
supra; MunsBe vs. McKellar, 39 Utah, 544, 118 P. 564;
Baker vs. Hatch, 10 Utah, 1, 257 P. 673'.''
Hence from the above, it is noted that the action of the
above court, in failing to make findings as required, constituted reversible error. This is also borne out by the cases of
Parish vs. McConkie, 84 Utah, 396, 35 P (2d) 1001; Hillyard
vs. District Court of Cache County, supra; and \Vatson vs.
Watson, 72 Utah, 128, 269 P. 775.
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The statute 104-26-3 noted in the above quotation has
been superseded by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is much more comprehensive than the fonnP-r
section of the civil code. Rule 52 (a) in part provides as follows:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court :.hall, unless the same
are waived, find the facts specially and state separat~ly
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the
appropriate judgment; an.d in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclu:sions of law which constitute the ground of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review . . . ,. (Italics mine)
From the above it is evident that the failure to make findings

on all the material is:mes rendered any judgment of contempt
by the trial court against the defendant Harold Cook, null
and void and as such constitutes reversible error. This is borne
out by the cases of Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache Countty, supra; Parish vs. McConkie, supra; State vs. Bartholomew,
supra; and Piper vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P. (2d) 909.
POINT 9.
THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING PUNISHMENT WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE CHARGE OF
CONTEMPT AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
Section 78-32-4 provides that no warrant of commitment
can be issued without a previous attachment to answer or a
notice of order to show cause. This section provides that, upon
the filing of an affidavit with the court as contemplated by
78-32-3, the court rna y order an attachment of the person or the
service of an order to show cause upon the person accused of
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contempt. (The above has reference to cases where the contempt alleged is not committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court or judge in chambers.) From the above
it is evident that in the instant case there could be no commitment by the court of the defendant, Harold Cook, for the
alleged charge without giving him the opportunity to be heard
relative to the charge placed against him or notice as provided
by law. In the cases of constructive or indirect contempt, before a person can be found guilty of contempt, he must have
due and reasonable notice of the proceeding; so ordinarily
there should issue an attachment or an order to show cause
why the accused should not be punished or why an attachment should not issue.
The notice required to be given a person charged with
contempt not committed in the court's presence was held to be
reasonable notice only where the accused has notice which will
fairly and fully enable him to know the specific acts with
which he i:-; charged. A statute requiring a notice of a contempt proceeding to be in writing must be complied with. 17
C.J.S. 97-99. The only notice defendant had of any charge of
contempt was the answer of counsel for plaintiff to a direct
question from the Court as to whether the grandparents (defendants) might be guilty of contempt in allowing the child to
go with his father after the service of the Order counsel stated,
..It would soom to me that they would be, because the child
was here when they were served with an order requiring them
to have him in court this morning." (R. 2); also at page 38 of
the record where the court points out that the questions before
the court are ( a ) the right to the child's custody and (b) the
contempt. The notice mentioned and afforded the defendant
of the charge of contempt was not sufficient nor of the dignity
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fendant sufficient time in which to prepare, or trial, present
evidence, or answer any charges made.
Thus, from the above it is evident that the failure of the
trial court to give the defendant reasonable notice of the charge
of contempt was reversible error.
CONCLUSION
It is the defendanfs contention that the trial court committed the fundamental errors herein assigned in that:

1. It was without jurisdiction to award the custody of the
child to anyone, the child being out of the jurisdiction of the
court according to its own finding;

2. There was no affidavit setting forth the acts constituting the contempt alleged ever filed or served upon defendant
in order to clothe the court with jurisdiction to hear the contempt charged;
3. The record yields no evidence upon which a judgment
or conviction of contempt can be sustained;
4. The court's holding that defendant's failure to notify
certain officials of the departure of the child was an attempt
to place the defendant under an obligation to the court by
indirection without specific instructions in relation thereto;
5. It held that the defendant could have denied the
natural father the right to take the child with him;
6. The court, by providing that the defendant could purge
himself of part of the sentence of contempt upon the performance of conditions, attempted to secure the custody of the
minor child to the plaintiff by circuity and by coercion which
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would result in a denial of the natural father's opportunity to
be heard;
7. The defendant was given no opportunity to present
answers as provided for by law;
8. The court failed to enter findings and conclusions as
required by law, thus rendering its judgment null and void;
9. The defendant was not given due and proper notice
of the charge of contempt against him prior to his conviction.
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that the action of the
trial court be reversed; that the iudgment and conviction of
contempt against defendant be vacated and declared null and
void; and that the award of custody to plaintiff be declared
a nullity because of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY E. NASH,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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